Sasquatch Privacy

Methodology

Evidence and methodology

This page is for anyone who needs to understand how a result was produced before relying on it: counsel, an expert, an auditor, or a privacy lead.

Sasquatch Privacy provides technical privacy observations and is not legal advice.

01

How a scan is collected

The scanner opens each page in a real Chromium browser, not a text fetch, so tag managers, scripts and consent tools behave as they do for a visitor. It honours robots.txt, and does not run two scans against the same site at once. It does not circumvent access controls. Pages come from the sitemap or a crawl from the entry page, up to the limit of the plan, and coverage is recorded in the result.

02

The four consent states

01
Before consent
The page is loaded and no consent control is touched. Requests recorded here happened without any visitor choice.
02
After Accept All
The scanner activates the consent tool's accept control and records again. This shows what is added when a visitor agrees.
03
After Reject All
A fresh visit in which the scanner activates the reject control. Requests to tracking hosts recorded here are listed for review.
04
With Global Privacy Control
A fresh visit that sends Sec-GPC: 1. The set of hosts contacted is compared with the visit without the signal.

03

What is and is not recorded

Recorded

  • The host of each request, and a hash of its path.
  • Cookies: name, domain, lifetime and flags.
  • Local and session storage: keys.
  • Which page and which consent state each request was seen in, with counts and time offsets.
  • Screenshots of each page in each consent state.
  • Whether the entry page links to a privacy policy, a “Do Not Sell or Share / Your Privacy Choices” link and a cookie-settings link. Reported, not scored.

Not recorded

  • Full URLs and query strings. Query strings on a site routinely carry its visitors' personal information, so they are never stored.
  • Request bodies, response bodies and request or response headers.
  • Storage values and cookie values.
  • What a vendor did with anything it received.

This is by design. A privacy scanner should not itself collect the data it is looking for.

04

Regions and egress verification

Scans can run from the United States, California, New York, the European Union and the United Kingdom. The result records the region requested and whether the scan’s network egress was verified to be in that region. Where verification is not recorded as passed, do not treat the region as confirmed.

05

How findings and the score are derived

Every site starts at 100 and loses weighted points against rules in a published rubric. The rubric, with its version, is embedded in every result, so a score can be re-derived from the observations and the rubric that produced it. Each finding has a severity, a confidence and the hosts behind it. A finding is an observation (detected, observed, review recommended); the wording is deliberately not a legal characterisation.

06

Integrity

  • i

    A SHA-256 digest of the result is recorded when the platform receives it from the scanner.

  • ii

    A SHA-256 of each screenshot is computed at capture time and listed in the screenshot manifest. Scans completed before the evidence package was introduced do not have capture-time hashes.

  • iii

    The evidence package is signed (Ed25519) when the deployment has a signing key configured. The public key is published at /.well-known/evidence-signing-key.

How to verify

  1. 01

    Compute the SHA-256 of a screenshot file you hold and compare it with the hash for that file in the screenshot manifest.

  2. 02

    If the package carries a signature, fetch the public key from the address above and verify the Ed25519 signature over the package with a standard tool.

These checks show the files match what the platform recorded. They do not show that the website behaved the same way at any other time.

07

Custody and retention

The package includes a custody record of how the result moved from the scanner to the platform. Screenshots are kept in private storage and served only through a link that checks the scan’s access token on every request. The platform does not keep a log of who opened a result. Audits are retained for 365 days; monitor scans are retained according to the plan. Download the evidence package if you need it for longer.

08

Known limitations

  1. 01

    One automated visit per page per state from one region at one point in time. Behaviour can differ for other visitors, devices, regions and dates.

  2. 02

    Because only the host and a path hash are kept, a result shows that a request went to a vendor and when, not what data it carried.

  3. 03

    A consent control that the scanner cannot detect (a second layer, a non-English label, a banner in a frame, or one shown only to some regions) can cause a finding that a person would not make, or hide one.

  4. 04

    A server-side response to Global Privacy Control is not externally observable.

  5. 05

    Vendor classification uses a maintained list; hosts not on it are reported as unidentified.

  6. 06

    Results are observations for counsel to analyse, not conclusions. They do not establish that any law applies to the site, or that any practice is or is not permitted.

  7. 07

    Coverage is externally observable website behaviour only: not privacy-policy content review, data mapping, access and deletion requests, vendor contracts, mobile apps or internal systems.

09

Frameworks annex

This annex lists legal texts that counsel commonly reviews in connection with each kind of technical observation in this report. It is a reading list, not a legal analysis: it does not state that any provision applies to this website or that any observation is inconsistent with it. Applicability depends on facts this scan cannot observe, including who operates the site, where its visitors are, what the recorded requests contained and what agreements are in place with each recipient.

References last reviewed 2026-11-12

01

Requests to third-party hosts classified as tracking were recorded on page load, before any interaction with a consent control.

  • European Union: Directive 2002/58/EC (ePrivacy Directive), Article 5(3). Storing information on, or gaining access to information stored on, a user's device, and the consent and exemptions that relate to it.
  • European Union: Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR), Articles 4(11), 6(1)(a) and 7. The definition of consent and the conditions for relying on it.
  • United Kingdom: Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, regulation 6. Storing or accessing information on a user's device, and the consent and exemptions that relate to it.
  • California: Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100(a); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 11, § 7012. Notice to consumers at or before the point of collection.
  • California: Cal. Penal Code §§ 631 and 638.51 (California Invasion of Privacy Act). Interception of communications, and the use of pen registers and trap-and-trace devices; frequently pleaded in litigation about website tracking technologies.

Not established by the scan: Whether each request stored or read information on the device, what data it carried, whether an exemption applies, and which jurisdictions' visitors the site serves.

02

Tracking requests after Reject All

After the scanner activated the site's Reject All control, requests to third-party hosts classified as tracking were recorded.

  • European Union: Directive 2002/58/EC (ePrivacy Directive), Article 5(3). Storing information on, or gaining access to information stored on, a user's device, and the consent and exemptions that relate to it.
  • European Union: GDPR, Articles 7(3) and 21. Withdrawal of consent and the right to object.
  • United Kingdom: Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, regulation 6. Storing or accessing information on a user's device, and the consent and exemptions that relate to it.
  • California: Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.120 and 1798.135. A consumer's right to opt out of the sale or sharing of personal information, and the methods a business provides for doing so.
  • California: Cal. Code Regs. tit. 11, § 7004. Requirements for methods of submitting consumer requests and obtaining consent, including symmetry of choice.

Not established by the scan: What the recorded requests contained, whether the recipients act as processors or service providers under contract, and whether the control the scanner activated is the site's intended opt-out mechanism.

03

No observable change with Global Privacy Control

The set of third-party hosts contacted with a Global Privacy Control signal (Sec-GPC: 1) did not observably differ from the set contacted without it.

  • California: Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.135(b) and (e); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 11, § 7025. Opt-out preference signals and how a business processes them.
  • Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-1306(1)(a)(IV); 4 Colo. Code Regs. 904-3, Part 5. Universal opt-out mechanisms.
  • Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-520(e). Opt-out preference signals sent by a platform, technology or mechanism.
  • United States (other states): Other state comprehensive privacy statutes. Several other states have adopted opt-out preference signal provisions with differing effective dates; counsel should confirm which apply.

Not established by the scan: Whether the site sells or shares personal information as those terms are defined, whether the signal changed what was sent to the same hosts (a server-side response is not externally observable), and whether the business is subject to these statutes.

04

Session replay vendor requests

Requests to a vendor classified as session replay were recorded. The scanner does not record what the vendor's script captured.

  • California: Cal. Penal Code §§ 631 and 638.51 (California Invasion of Privacy Act). Interception of communications, and the use of pen registers and trap-and-trace devices; frequently pleaded in litigation about website tracking technologies.
  • United States (federal): 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (Wiretap Act). Interception of electronic communications and the consent exception.
  • United States (other states): State wiretap statutes, including Fla. Stat. § 934.03 and 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5701 et seq.. State interception statutes, some of which require the consent of all parties.
  • European Union: GDPR, Articles 5(1)(c), 6 and 13. Data minimisation, lawful basis and information given to data subjects.
  • European Union: Directive 2002/58/EC (ePrivacy Directive), Article 5(3). Storing information on, or gaining access to information stored on, a user's device, and the consent and exemptions that relate to it.

Not established by the scan: Which interactions or form fields the tool captures, how it is configured for masking, whether visitors were told about it and agreed, and the vendor's contractual role.

05

No equally prominent reject control found

The scanner did not find a control that declines non-essential cookies with the same prominence as the control that accepts them.

  • European Union: GDPR, Articles 4(11) and 7(3). Freely given consent, and withdrawing consent as easily as it was given.
  • European Union: European Data Protection Board, Report of the work undertaken by the Cookie Banner Taskforce (17 January 2023). Supervisory authorities' shared positions on reject options and banner design.
  • United Kingdom: Information Commissioner's Office, Guidance on the use of storage and access technologies. The regulator's expectations for consent mechanisms.
  • California: Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.140(l); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 11, § 7004. Dark patterns and symmetry in choice.

Not established by the scan: Whether a reject option exists in a form the scanner does not detect (a second layer, a non-English label, a banner inside a frame, or a banner shown only to visitors from particular regions).

06

Cookies with a lifetime longer than the report's stated threshold were recorded.

  • European Union: GDPR, Article 5(1)(e). Storage limitation.
  • European Union: CNIL (France), Guidelines and Recommendation on cookies and other trackers (17 September 2020). A supervisory authority's recommendations on cookie lifetimes and how long a recorded choice remains valid.
  • European Union: Directive 2002/58/EC (ePrivacy Directive), Article 5(3). Storing information on, or gaining access to information stored on, a user's device, and the consent and exemptions that relate to it.

Not established by the scan: The purpose of each cookie, whether it is exempt as strictly necessary, and whether its value identifies a person.

07

Cookies set on domains other than the scanned site were recorded.

  • European Union: Directive 2002/58/EC (ePrivacy Directive), Article 5(3). Storing information on, or gaining access to information stored on, a user's device, and the consent and exemptions that relate to it.
  • United Kingdom: Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, regulation 6. Storing or accessing information on a user's device, and the consent and exemptions that relate to it.
  • California: Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.140(k), (ad) and (ah). Definitions of cross-context behavioural advertising, sale and sharing of personal information.
  • California: Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.120 and 1798.135. A consumer's right to opt out of the sale or sharing of personal information, and the methods a business provides for doing so.

Not established by the scan: What each cookie is used for, whether the recipient combines it with activity on other sites, and the contractual terms with that recipient.

08

Unidentified third-party hosts

Requests were recorded to third-party hosts that the scanner's vendor list does not identify.

  • European Union: GDPR, Articles 13(1)(e), 28 and 30. Informing data subjects of recipients, contracts with processors, and records of processing activities.
  • California: Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100(d); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 11, § 7051. Agreements with service providers, contractors and third parties.

Not established by the scan: Who operates each host, what it received, and whether it is already covered by an existing vendor agreement under a different name.

Sasquatch Privacy provides technical privacy observations and is not legal advice.